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ABSTRACT 
 
TONER, JP (1993).  Taxi licensing policy 1985-1991.  ITS Working Paper 372, Institute for 
Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds. 
 
This paper reviews the effects of the 1985 Transport Act in the Taxi Industry, drawing on the results 
of surveys of local authorities in 1988, 1989 and 1991.  Overall, we find that the Transport Act has 
had limited success in achieving its objectives.  In restricted markets, a substantial and increasing 
licence premium is enjoyed by licence holders.  In deregulated districts, we see generally lower 
standards of quality enforcement and severe shortages of rank capacity.  We think the use of 
passenger working time as the sole intention for determining regulatory policy is likely to perpetuate 
these problems, and thus a review of regulation is required so that a better compromise between 
competing objectives can be achieved. 
 
KEY-WORDS: Taxis and hire cars; regulation and deregulation; 1985 Transport Act. 
 
Contact: Dr JP Toner, Institute for Transport Studies (tel: 0532-335349) 
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TAXI LICENSING POLICY 1985-1991 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to review the effects of the Transport Act, 1985, which partially 
deregulated entry to the hackney carriage ("taxi") industry.  It draws on the results of two research 
projects at the Institute for Transport Studies undertaken over the last five years which were funded 
by the Science and Engineering Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council.  
There are eight sections to the paper.  The remainder of this section presents details of the replies to 
our surveys; we then deal with: licensing policy; vehicle numbers; fares; enforcement; rank 
designation; and taxis as public transport. We conclude with a summary of the effects of the 1985 
Transport Act. 
 
In January 1988, March 1989 and November 1991, we sent questionnaires to 333 district councils in 
England and Wales, 36 metropolitan councils and the council of the Isles of Scilly.  We excluded 
from the survey Scotland and the North of Ireland where taxis are licensed under different 
legislation, and also excluded the London boroughs, where taxi licensing is carried out by the 
Metropolitan Police.  From the total of 370, the population further reduced to 365 by the exclusion 
of two districts whose licensing is undertaken jointly with a neighbouring authority (the two joint 
schemes are Middlesbrough and Langbaurgh, and Gillingham and Rochester) and the three districts 
which fall wholly within the Metropolitan Police area.  320 councils replied to the first survey, 286 
to the second survey and 292 to the third. Only four out of 365 councils did not respond to at least 
one of the surveys.  We are thus happy that the sample is representative, since almost all councils 
responded. 
 
 
2.TAXI LICENSING POLICY 
 
In this section, we consider the extent and scope of taxi and hire car licensing, examine the licensing 
policies pursued and look at policies towards wheelchair accessible vehicles and use of the 
Metropolitan Conditions of Fitness. 
 
Table 1, below, examines the growth of taxi and hire car licensing since 1980.  As can be seen, 
section 15 of the Transport Act has introduced hackney carriage licensing to 15 per cent of districts 
for the first time. Along with this, there has been a growth in hire car licensing; less than 60 per cent 
of districts licensed hire cars in 1980; now, over 95 per cent do, including many of the districts 
which only introduced any taxi licensing function under section 16.  Entry regulation in the taxi 
sector peaked at about 75 per cent of districts just before the Act; now the figure is 54 per cent.  
There has been an increase in fares control as well; councils which introduced licensing in 1986 
have largely introduced fares controls as well. 
  
 
 2 
Table 1: Growth of licensing 
 
 1980 1985 1988 1991 
 No % No % No % No % 
Hackney licensing 305 82.4 312 84.6 316 99.1 292 100 
Hire car licensing 221 59.9 259 70.2 274 86.4 280 95.9 
Entry restrictions 249 67.5 274 74.3 179 57.2 157 54.0 
Fare regulation 278 75.3 290 78.6 281 88.9 273 93.5 
Districts in sample 369 - 369 - 320 - 292 - 
 
 
From the information supplied by councils, we can determine their taxi licensing policy.  More 
specifically, we can investigate the extent of deregulation by dividing councils into two groups; 
those which have no numerical limits on entry and those which retain quantity control.  Those 
which retain quantity control fall into two groups; those which have issued no new taxi plates since 
the Transport Act, and those which have issued some notwithstanding their policy of restricting 
entry.  Districts which are deregulated fall into one of three categories;  those which have 
deregulated since the Transport Act, those which have been deregulated since before the Transport 
Act, and those which have introduced taxi licensing since the Act and have not imposed a numerical 
limit.  Table 2 below summarises councils' taxi licensing policies. 
 
Table 2: Taxi licensing policy 
 
 1988 1989 1991 
 No % No % No % 
0 No issue of plates since Act 86 27.2 57 20.1 42 14.4 
1 Issued some plates but restrict 95 30.1 104 36.7 115 39.5 
2 Deregulated since Act 59 18.7 56 19.8 72 24.7 
3 Always deregulated 29 9.2 26 9.2 27 9.3 
4 Started lic. since Act - dereg 47 14.9 40 14.1 35 12.0 
Total districts in sample 316 100.0 271 100.0 291 100.0 
Policy not known 49 - 84 - 74 - 
Total licensing districts 365 - 365 - 365 - 
 
 
From Table 2, it can be seen that 54% of all councils still retain numerical limits on entry.  If we 
consider only councils which regulated taxis (in part or all of their area) before the Act, we can see 
that out of 256 councils in categories 0 to 3 in 1991, 28% have deregulated as a result of the Act and 
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61.3 have retained limits.  In other words, for every council which has deregulated entry in line with 
the aim of the Transport Act, over two have not done. 
 
We can also look at changes in policy between 1988 and 1989.  For the 241 councils for which we 
have information for both years, five councils had introduced a policy of deregulation, but another 
five which had previously been deregulated reimposed numerical limits.  16 out of 65 councils 
which had issued no new plates up to 1988 issued some in 1989; we are aware of other councils 
which have issued extra plates since then, mostly to vehicles capable of carrying passengers in 
wheelchairs. 
 
Another indicator of the lack of success of the Transport Act in liberalising entry can be seen from 
the fact that 31% of councils maintain a waiting list of applicants to whom they would grant 
licences in the event of extra plates being made available; the average length of the waiting list 
where it existed was 64.  As well as this, 21% of councils have refused, during 1991, to grant a plate 
to at least one applicant for the purpose of limiting the number of taxis. The mean number of 
refusals was 10.2 .  There is also the question of the licence premium.  In districts which replied to 
both surveys, and where a premium existed both times, the average value rose from £8,880 in 1988 
to £12,899 in 1991.  Allowing for inflation, this is an increase in real terms of 13%.  Clearly users of 
taxis in districts which have not deregulated have not benefitted from the Transport Act; indeed, 
things have got slightly worse in those areas. 
 
In the 1991 survey, we asked about the compulsory use of wheelchair-accessible (WAC) or 
purpose-built (MCF) taxis. 6 per cent of authorities already have the full fleet WAC/MCF, 8.2% 
specify WAC/MCF for new licences and replacement vehicles, and 9.6% specify WAC/MCF for 
new licences.    Although a total of 67 out of 281 authorities have a policy, there are wheelchair 
accessible vehicles available for hire in 176 districts, with an average 14.3 such vehicles.  35 
districts are aiming at full wheelchair accessibility by 2000, and in theory three already have it. 
 
 
3. VEHICLE NUMBERS 
 
As well as the Transport Act's effects on licensing policy, we can also measure its impact in terms 
of the number of vehicles licensed.  Prior to 1986, the growth rates of fleet sizes for taxis and hire 
cars were about two per cent per annum and six per cent per annum respectively.  We can 
extrapolate this trend and apply it to the figures we have for fleet sizes in 1986.  The base fleet sizes 
were, on average, 66 for taxis and 119 for private hires.  Applying the growth rates which pertained 
before the Act, we would expect by 1988 to have 68 taxis and 135 hire cars.  In fact, as table 3 
shows, in 1988 there were on average 76 taxis and 127 hire cars.  There are eight more taxis than 
expected, but eight less hire cars.  The total fleet size in 1988 was as expected, it was just the 
balance between the two sectors which was different. (These figures apply only to districts which 
licensed taxis before 1986.) 
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Table 3: Vehicle numbers 
 
 1986 1988 1988 
predicted 
1989 1991 
Mean Hackneys 66 76 68 87 97 
Mean Hire Cars 119 127 135 151 186 
Mean Total 185 203 203 238 283 
Hackneys per Hire Car 0.54 0.60 0.50 0.57 0.52 
 
 
When we look at the 1989 figures, it seems that the previous one-for-one substitution of taxis for 
hire cars has ceased;  both taxi and hire car figures show very great growth between 1988 and 1989. 
 Since 1989, growth has continued at a higher rate than before the Transport Act, but is now slower 
than in the years immediately following implementation of the Act. Overall, the number of taxis has 
increased by 47% and the number of hire cars by 56% since the Transport Act.  Although this 
growth is larger than expected, the balance between the taxi and hire car fleets is largely the same as 
before, with about one taxi for every two hire cars, and the hire car fleet has grown at a faster rate 
than the taxi fleet.  Since the Transport Act should have had no effect on hire cars, unless it be to 
cause them to become taxis, it seems possible that other factors, especially a relatively buoyant 
economy in the mid-to-late 1980s, are responsible for the increase.  Indeed, in districts which have 
been deregulated since before the Transport Act, there has been a much greater growth in fleet size 
than before the Act.  This again suggests that factors other than the liberalising influence of the 
Transport Act are responsible for the growth. 
 
We can also examine differences in fleet size and growth rates according to licensing policy.  Table 
4 presents the percentage changes in fleet size over the years 1986 to 1991 according to policy. 
 
Table 4: Changes in fleet size 1986-1991 
 
 0 No issue 
since Act 
1 Issue 
some but 
restrict 
2 Dereg 
since Act 
3 Dereg 
before Act  
4 Lic 
intro'd 
since Act 
% change in hackneys 0 41.1 111.1 114.1 203.2 
% change in hire cars 133.0 47.9 3.0 29.2 26.4 
% change in total fleet 75.7 44.7 41.9 63.6 50.7 
 
 
There is clearly some variation across districts.  Disregarding districts which have introduced 
licensing since 1985, the greatest growth in hackney numbers has been in districts which have 
always been deregulated and on whom section 16 of the Transport Act has had no effect, although 
those which have deregulated since the Act are not far behind.  Not surprisingly, the greatest 
increase in hire cars has been in districts which have issued no new hackney plates; note, though, 
that even in districts where hackney licences have always been freely available, the hire car sector 
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has grown by 29%. This suggests that there is still a role for the hire car, and that a one-tier system 
is not wanted by all the trade. 
 
Looking at overall fleet sizes, we have a very surprising result. The biggest increase in the total 
number of vehicles available for hire by the public has been seen in districts which have issued no 
new hackney plates, and the smallest increase has been in districts which have deregulated since 
the Transport Act. It had been anticipated that the Transport Act's liberalising measures would 
increase the vehicles available in deregulated districts.  
 
 
4. FARES 
 
There are a number of indicators we can use to determine whether deregulation has had an impact 
on the regulated hackney fares.  Other things being equal, we would expect to find higher fares in 
districts with more cabs per head of population, since drivers need a higher fare per hiring to 
compensate for a reduced occupancy rate.  The five indicators we tested were: relationship between 
fare levels and supply (1988 figures); relationship between fare levels and licensing policy (1988 
figures); whether there had been a fares increase in the last 12 months and licensing policy (1988 
and 1989 figures); relationship between the mean level of fares and licensing policy (1991 figures); 
and the involvement of the trade in fare-setting procedures (1988 figures). 
 
The fares data were obtained from rate cards supplied by the local authorities.  Because of the 
diversity of the charging structure across districts, and the impossibility of achieving a consistent 
continuous analysis, three fares were used; the fare for two people making a two mile trip during the 
day (FARE22), that fare for two people making a four mile trip during the day (FARE24) and the 
fare for four people making a four mile trip at night (NIGHT).  The first analysis was the calculation 
of correlation coefficients between fare levels and indicators of supply (taxis per head of population 
(HACSUP), private hire cars per capita (PRIVSUP) and total fleet size per capita (TOTSUP)).  
Small but significant results were found between FARE24 and PRIVSUP, NIGHT and PRIVSUP, 
and NIGHT and TOTSUP (all negative) and between FARE24 and HACSUP, and NIGHT and 
HACSUP (both positive).  The former suggests that a large supply of private hires has the effect of 
keeping the regulated hackney fare down, presumably because of the existence of competition.  The 
positive relationship between fares and supply of taxis seems to bear out the hypothesis that more 
taxis need a higher fare to sustain the business, and implicitly that deregulation of numbers creates 
pressure for fares to rise because the higher service quality created does not generate sufficient new 
business to pay for the extra cabs, meaning that the quality of service elasticity must be less than 
unit.  To examine this further, we looked at the relationship between fares and licensing policy.  By 
grouping the data, it was possible to conduct statistical tests on the hypothesis that there was no 
relationship between fares level and licensing policy.  We found that districts which had issued no 
new plates were more likely to have low night time fares and less likely to have high night time 
fares, again suggesting that drivers can compensate for low daytime earnings when there are entry 
restrictions since they can make money at night with relatively low fares because they are so busy. 
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Table 5: Fares increase in last 12 months (% in ()) 
 
 0 No issue 
since Act 
1 Issue but 
restricted 
2 Dereg since 
Act 
3 Dereg 
before Act 
Yes 
 % 
9 
(19.6) 
21 
(23.1) 
12 
(23.6) 
2 
(12.5) 
No 
 % 
37 
(80.4) 
70 
(76.9) 
39 
(76.4) 
14 
(87.5) 
 
In 1988, we found little relationship between the incidence of fares increases and licensing policy; 
possibly things had not settled down.  However as Table 5 shows, by 1989, districts which had 
deregulated since the Transport Act were more likely to have had a fares increase in the preceding 
twelve months, as were districts which had issued some taxi plates but maintained a policy of entry 
restriction.  The effects are not strong, though, and this evidence is therefore inconclusive. 
 
Another indicator is the mean level of fares according to licensing policy (Table 6).  In this case, the 
means and standard deviations of fares are all broadly similar, apart perhaps from night time fares in 
districts which have deregulated since the Transport Act; these fares are significantly higher than in 
other districts. 
 
Table 6: Fares according to licensing policy 
 
 0 No issue 
since Act 
1 Issue but 
restricted 
2 Dereg since 
Act 
3 Dereg 
before Act 
2 miles 2 people Mean 
 sd 
£2.28 
(0.25) 
£2.49 
(0.33) 
£2.38 
(0.27) 
£2.12 
(0.34) 
4 miles 2 people Mean 
 sd 
£3.89 
(0.44) 
£4.22 
(0.53) 
£4.15 
(0.51) 
£3.69 
(0.64) 
night 4 miles Mean 
 sd 
£5.46 
(1.39) 
£5.74 
(1.09) 
£6.14 
(1.20) 
£5.33 
(1.16) 
 
Fares applicable in November 1991 
 
The final indicator is the involvement of the trade in setting fares.  We accept that the trade would 
not ask for a fares increase which would reduce their revenue.  However, if a fares increase would 
increase revenue, the involvement of the trade in fare-setting procedures is likely to increase the 
pressure for and likelihood of an increase. 
 
Table 7: Trade involvement in fare-setting 
 
 0 No issue 
since Act 
1 Issue but 
restricted 
2 Dereg since 
Act 
3 Dereg 
before Act 
Yes 
 % 
21 
(24.4) 
16 
(18.4) 
16 
(27.1) 
5 
(22.7) 
No 
 % 
65 
(75.6) 
71 
(81.6) 
43 
(72.9) 
17 
(77.3) 
1988 figures 
Most use of trade evidence is made in districts which have deregulated since the Transport Act.  
Again, though, the above evidence is largely inconclusive.  All in all, the fares evidence is not able 
to support any strong conclusions about the effects of entry deregulation. The lack of effects in 
districts which have deregulated since the Act may be due to the trade using up the former excess 
profits represented by the licence premium so that now they break even.  In tightly regulated 
districts, the fares increases may have caused even greater profits, which are reflected in the 
premium values having increased.  As long as authorities continue to set fares and are guided by the 
criterion of reasonableness, the problems which have occurred in some American cities, which have 
seen deregulation result in massive price increases, can be avoided.  It thus seems that the argument 
in favour of maintaining quantity restrictions to avoid fares rises has little validity. 
 
 
5. ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND RESOURCES 
 
Limited minimum quality standards exist throughout the areas covered by the legislation; for 
example, taxis and hire cars must have at least four doors if they are saloon cars.  Some districts, 
though, specify standards in excess of these minimum requirements; the use of London-style black 
cabs, for example.  The scope of some controls is limited.  For example, districts can set a maximum 
vehicle age as a guideline, but an operator presenting an older vehicle in sufficiently good condition 
must be allowed to operate it.  Authorities were asked to indicate whether they had policies on 
various aspects of vehicle quality; these are reported in table 8. 
 
On the whole, districts which still limit entry are rather more likely to have higher standards than the 
minimum, although interestingly those districts which have issued some plates are the most likely to 
have a policy.  While this is only a rough guide, it suggests vehicle quality may be slightly worse in 
deregulated districts; this is what we would expect, other things being equal, from our a priori 
reasoning.  
 
Table 8: Proportion of councils having quality standards 
 
 0 No issue 
since Act 
1 Issue some 
but restrict 
2 Dereg since 
Act 
3 Dereg 
before Act 
Vehicle type 50.9 50.0 44.6 52.4 
Engine size 26.4 38.0 42.9 38.1 
Interior space 54.7 66.0 55.4 52.4 
Vehicle age 34.0 56.0 42.9 23.8 
Livery 34.0 32.0 33.9 23.8 
Sample size 53 100 56 21 
 
 
In addition to information on the attributes of vehicles which are controlled, we also attempted to 
measure how effectively councils' enforcement policies were implemented and monitored.  We did 
this by checking on councils' policies regarding vehicle testing.  There are basically two types of 
policy which can be adopted.  One is to check vehicles regularly, for example requiring owners to 
present their vehicles for inspection every six months.  The other is to conduct random inspections 
on street so that owners do not know when the test is due and therefore have to maintain the vehicle 
in good condition at all times.  We would argue that the most effective policy is to combine both of 
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these measures, since there is then no possibility of a rogue car slipping through the net.  Table 9 
shows that many more districts which restrict entry have a strong enforcement policy, while a 
number of deregulated districts have no policy at all. 
 
Table 9: Enforcement policy (proportion with policy) 
 
 0 No issue 
since Act 
1 Issue some 
since Act 
2 Dereg since 
Act 
3 Dereg 
before Act 
Regular checks 3.8 4.9 3.7 4.5 
Random checks 23.1 19.6 38.9 9.1 
Regular and random  71.2 73.5 50.0 50.0 
No policy 1.9 2.0 7.4 36.4 
Sample size 52 102 54 22 
 
 
It seems from this that there may be insufficient enforcement in deregulated districts.  One measure 
of this is provided by the number of enforcement staff in each district.  Since many enforcement 
officers have duties other than taxi licensing, this can only be a crude indicator; but we have data on 
full-time and part-time staffing levels.  In districts which still limit entry, there are on average 0.5 
full-time enforcement officers and 1.6 part-time enforcement officers (but we do not know how 
much of their time is spent on taxis).  This is in addition to the licensing staff.  In deregulated 
districts, excluding districts which only introduced licensing in 1986, there were 1.2 full-timers and 
0.4 part-timers.  While part of this difference can be ascribed to the typically smaller fleet sizes in 
deregulated districts, we have already identified the potential for standards to slip in deregulated 
districts if vehicle quality is not rigidly enforced, and it would seem desirable for greater resources 
to be allocated in order to promote a strong enforcement policy. 
 
 
6. RANK DESIGNATION 
 
An argument advanced before deregulation was the possibility that deregulation would cause 
overcrowding at taxi ranks, since councils would not be able to increase the supply of rank space at 
the rate cab numbers were increasing.  Rank overspill has long been recognised as a problem; the 
difficulty is in persuading highway authorities to give up scarce road space to create new taxi ranks. 
 DTp circular 3/85 dismisses the problems that deregulation may cause at taxi ranks by saying 
simply that councils "should look actively for sites for further ranks" (para. 27). We asked officers 
to assess the extent of rank overspill in their area; the results are summarised in table 10, along with 
an estimate of the mean number of rank spaces per taxi. 
 
Districts which have issued no new plates since the Transport Act have more spaces per taxi and 
find frequent rank overspill less of a problem.  For those which have issued some plates, but still 
restrict entry, the problem is more severe, with one third reporting rank overspill as a frequent 
occurrence.  In districts which have deregulated since the Act, the problem is even worse, and they 
only have 0.4 spaces per taxi, almost half that of the non-issuers.  Clearly rank provision in recently 
  
 
 9 
deregulated districts has not kept pace with the increase in numbers.  This is probably the strongest 
case for retaining numerical limits on entry; but there may be other institutional arrangements may 
achieve the desired result without distorting the market as much;  for example, councils could 
auction off permits to ply at the most popular ranks and cabs not in possession of a permit would 
have to operate from the other ranks or rely on radio bookings.  This might also be a way of 
generating trade at currently dormant ranks. 
 
Table 10: Rank overspill and rank provision 
 
 0 No issue 
since Act 
1 Issue some 
but restrict 
2 Dereg since 
Act 
3 Dereg 
before Act 
No overspill % 38.9 28.4 32.1 63.6 
Rare occurrence % 11.1 6.9 5.4 0 
Occasional occurrence % 29.6 31.4 19.6 4.5 
Frequent occurrence % 20.4 33.3 42.9 31.8 
Sample size % 54 102 56 22 
Mean spaces per taxi % 0.74 0.55 0.4 0.3 
 
 
7. TAXIS AS PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
 
In this section, we deal with the effects of sections 10 to 12 of the Transport Act, which cover 
shared taxis and taxibuses. Shared taxis have hardly made any impact. None were operational in 
1987, and the Ipswich experiment was a failure, as was the scheme between London railway 
stations.  According to our 1991 survey, eight schemes had been established, of which five were 
reckoned to work reasonably well, and three not. Taxibuses are more common, although it seems 
that the number of schemes is declining.  TRRL's survey in 1987 showed that, of 99 services which 
had been registered since January 1986, 44 were still running. Three reasons were identified for the 
failure of schemes: difficulty in persuading councils to grant hackney plates (although councils can 
apply a condition that taxibuses may not ply for hire); lack of demand for the services; and public 
unawareness of the schemes. The 1991 survey showed 47 routes operated by 76 vehicles licensed 
by 27 authorities; 85% of schemes were reported to be working well. All in all, the Transport Act 
has had relatively little impact as regards the introduction of innovative services. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
 
The main aim of the sections of the 1985 Transport Act dealing with taxis was to weaken the power 
of local authorities to control entry to the market.  The results of our work indicate that although 
85% of authorities have issued (or been prepared to issue) new licences since 1986, over half are 
still maintaining numerical limits.  The premium attached to ownership of a plate (where this exists) 
increased by 13% in real terms between 1988 and 1991, suggesting that in districts where entry 
controls remain, the market position of existing licence holders appears to have been strengthened. 
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The combined growth of taxi and hire car numbers has not been completely uniform, although 
growth everywhere has exceeded the growth rates over the early 1980s.  Clearly, hire cars are 
regarded as an inferior substitute, since their numbers have risen much faster in districts which 
maintain controls compared with those which have deregulated since the Act.  Even in the latter 
districts, though, as well as in districts which have always been deregulated, there has been some 
growth in hire car numbers, suggesting that there is still a role for this type of vehicle. 
 
The evidence on fares is mixed.  On the one hand, it appears that there exists the potential for the 
trade to push up fares in recently derestricted markets; on the other hand, there is some evidence to 
suggest that fares have also risen in regulated districts. 
 
Regarding vehicle quality enforcement, a lower proportion of authorities which have deregulated 
since the Act specify a desirable maximum age for vehicles, and a much lower proportion of 
deregulated districts as a whole have a rigorous policy on road-worthiness checks.  Seventeen per 
cent of deregulated authorities employ no checks at all, compared with less than two per cent of 
restricted districts. 
 
It has also been suggested that relaxing entry controls might contribute to traffic problems in town 
centres, since failure to provide additional rank capacity leads to increased cruising.  Evidence on 
the number of rank spaces per hackney indicates that provision in deregulated districts is about half 
that in restricted districts.  It is clear that in some circumstances, these conditions could add to 
problems of congestion and illegal parking. 
 
We have found little evidence that the Transport Act has been successful in stimulating new types of 
taxi service, such as shared taxis and taxibuses except in specialised circumstances.  Certainly, it 
seems that a formal shared taxi scheme is unlikely to take off, although impromptu shares late at 
night will presumably continue.  
 
Overall, we find that the Transport Act has had limited success in achieving its objectives.  In 
restricted markets, a substantial and increasing licence premium is enjoyed by licence holders.  In 
deregulated districts, we see generally lower standards of quality enforcement and severe shortages 
of rank capacity.  There has also been substantial expenditure by restricting districts seeking to 
maintain their position by commissioning studies of unmet demand.  The single criterion of 
passenger waiting times as a basis for determining regulatory policy is likely to perpetuate these 
problems.  Our findings suggest the need for a comprehensive review of regulation in the taxi 
industry so that a better compromise between competing objectives can be achieved. 
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